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Abstract—Anthropomorphism is a common phenomenon
known already in ancient times. It is not a thing of the past,
but still has a profound impact on major aspects of our lives
and on research in AI and HRI. Its importance in the field
of HRI is emphasized by the hotly-discussed uncanny valley
hypothesis. However, in spite of its popularity, the uncanny valley
hypothesis lacks empirical evidence. In this paper we suggest that
the community should stop trying to fit data to this hypothesis,
but rather, based on the available evidence, start talking about
the ‘uncanny curve’. Moreover, we point out mistakes in the
previous studies of the uncanny curve and strongly encourage
exploring it in a real HRI for it to be really relevant. We suggest
that understanding the opposite process of anthropomorphisation,
known as dehumanization, can help to cross the uncanny bottom
of the graph.
Keywords—human-robot interaction; uncanny valley; uncanny
curve, anthropomorphism.
I. INTRODUCTION
The word anthropomorphism has ancient Greek origins
and consists of two parts: anthro¯pos, meaning man or human
and morphic, having a specific shape or form. A phenomenon
of people attributing human-like characteristics to their sur-
rounding environment was described for the first time by
Xenophanes. In the 6th century BC he noted that the gods
whom people worship are depicted to resemble their believers
[1]. He further suggested that if horses or oxen had hands,
they would draw figures of gods that look similar to horses
or oxen. The importance of anthropomorphism in shaping
religious beliefs proposed by Xenophanes remained central in
modern theories of religion [2].
The phenomenon of anthropomorphism is not only time-
less, but also widespread though various domains that affect
human life, behaviour and laws. Anti-choice advocates liken
an unborn human fetus to a human being as one of the main
arguments opposing abortion [3]. In Spain captive chimpanzees
were granted limited human rights as a result of evidence for
the presence of mind [4]. Moreover, it is common to call our
planet ‘Mother Earth’ and anthropomorphism is involved in
discussions about environmental concerns [5]. It is used to sell
products [6], [7] or design user-friendly technological agents
[8]. Finally, it has been used to describe non-human animals
[9], weather patterns [10] or moving geometrical figures [11].
A. Why do we anthropomorphize?
Many recent theories of religion make stronger claims
about the role of anthropomorphism in religion, originating
with the philosopher David Hume, who famously said, ‘There
is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings
like themselves ... We find human faces in the moon, armies
in the clouds’ [12, p. 29]. These theories hypothesize that
an evolved tendency to anthropomorphism explains both the
origin and persistence of religious experience and beliefs
(e.g. [13]–[17]). Anthropomorphism is also involved in certain
auditory and visual hallucinations associated with epileptic or
psychiatric disorders – for example, the ‘sensed presence’ (or
‘felt presence’) phenomenon, where a subject senses or feels
another person’s presence, when in fact noone is there (e.g.
[18]). The sensed-presence phenomenon can be induced by
stimulating electrodes implanted in the left temporoparietal
junction of the brain [19]. Neuroscientists pinpoint different
areas of the brain as the neural correlates of religious and
similar anomalous experiences (e.g. [20]); the temporal lobe
is frequently suggested as the location of religious experiences
(e.g. [21], [22]). Researchers have also found a correlation be-
tween the sensed-presence phenomenon and certain personality
characteristics, including suggestibility [23].
If we have evolved to see and hear humans and human-like
gods so readily, what explains this tendency? Based on Guthrie
[2], various theorists have argued that anthropomorphism is
adaptive; early humans who interpreted ambiguous shapes
as human minimized their risks of being killed by enemies
and maximized their chances of making friends. A special-
purpose, hair-triggered mechanism to detect agents – the
‘hypersensitive agency detection device’ (HADD) – has been
hypothesized (e.g. [24], [25]). It is also argued that several
different psychological mechanisms generate the impression
of agents [26].
II. ANTHROPOMORPHISM IN AI
A. The centrality of anthropomorphism in AI
Computer scientists have long been aware of how easily
humans anthropomorphize machines. In 1948 Turing said that
playing chess against even a ‘paper machine’ (a simulation of
machine behaviour by a human being using paper and pencil)
gives ‘a definite feeling that one is pitting one’s wits against
something alive’ ( [27, p. 412]; see [28], [29]). Researchers
have varying aims in building anthropomorphic robots to be
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used in the investigation of human-robot interaction. Some
social roboticists have narrow aims. These include using HRI
in order to: test psychological hypotheses about human social
and cognitive behaviour and development (e.g. [30]); produce
service, entertainment, and therapeutic robots, with which
humans with no specialized training can interact intuitively
(e.g. [31]–[34]); increase learning and training opportunities
for machines, by building machines that can learn new be-
haviours from humans via normal social cues (e.g. [35]). The
‘believability’ of the robot is particularly important in socially
assistive robotics (see [36]; for the notion of ‘believable
creatures’, see [37]).
Roboticists may also have grander aims. Anthropomor-
phism is central to AI in ways that go to the philosophical
foundations of the field. Turing suggested in 1950 that one
approach to machine intelligence would be to provide a ma-
chine with ‘the best sense organs that money can buy’, and then
‘teach it to understand and speak English’ [38, p. 460]. The
humanoid robot has often been seen as the ‘holy grail’ of AI.
More recently proponents of embodied and socially situated
AI have argued that intelligence requires embodiment, and
that human-like intelligence requires human-like embodiment.
Descartes notoriously said that, even if machines looked like
human beings and ‘imitated our actions as closely as possible
for all practical purposes, we should still have certain means
of recognizing that they were not real men’; they would not be
able to use language ‘so as to give an appropriately meaningful
answer to whatever is said in its presence, as the dullest of men
can do’ and they would behave in ways that ‘would reveal
that they were acting not through understanding but only from
the disposition of their organs’ [39, pp. 139-140]. Modern
work in AI on anthropomorphic machines, and on human-
robot interaction that resembles human-human interaction, is
a potential reply to such scepticism.
B. Is there nothing to ‘mind’ but anthropomorphizing?
It has been suggested that caregivers naturally and unwit-
tingly anthropomorphize infants – for example, by interpreting
a neonate’s purely reflexive facial display as a smile. Anthropo-
morphizing human infants, by attributing intentions and affect
to babies, may have evolutionary value: it promotes infant-
caregiver bonding and enables the infant to learn social inter-
actions. Social and developmental roboticists aim to exploit the
same tendency to anthropomorphism, in order to build ‘socially
intelligent’ robots (see e.g. [40], [41]). These researchers
are attempting to build what Turing called a child-machine
( [38]; see [42]). They emphasize ‘theory of mind’ abilities,
such as face and agent detection, joint visual attention, self-
recognition, and success in false belief tasks (e.g. [43]–[46]).
These abilities are acquired early in development and serve as
the building-blocks for later cognitive behaviour.
Researchers aim to exploit theories in human ethology and
developmental psychology, creating a system architecture for
the robot that is analogous to a human’s (hypothesized) cog-
nitive architecture (e.g. [47]). Human observers interact with
such robots (the canonical example is the now-retired Kismet)
in some ways as if the robots were infants. The researchers’
aim is also that the robot will learn just as the infant learns,
via the observer’s anthropomorphizing. This raises a critical
philosophical question: if we must anthropomorphize both
humans and machines, and both as a result acquire ‘social
intelligence’, why deny that machines can think?
C. The risks of anthropomorphism in AI
The focus on human-like AIs has been criticized for various
reasons (see [48]). It is sometimes argued that an emphasis
on anthropomorphic machines leads the general public to
misunderstand the aims and achievements of AI (e.g. [49]).
Powerful voices within AI have argued for research into
‘generic’ intelligence, and against the idea of imitating human
performance (e.g. [50]).
The real danger to the field is that we are blinded by
our tendency to interpret artificial systems as human [51],
[52]. This tendency makes it too easy to convince us of the
intelligence, human-level or otherwise, of a machine. This is
the forensic problem of anthropomorphism [28]. Anthropomor-
phizing risks introducing bias (in favour of the machine) into
judgements of intelligence in machines – unless the risk is
mitigated, these judgements are suspect.
III. ANTHROPOMORPHISM IN HRI
A. The scope of anthropomorphism
Considering the chronic tendency of people to anthropo-
morphize their environment, it should not be surprising that
this topic gathered a lot of attention in the field of HRI. Reeves
and Nass [53] in a series of experiments under the ‘Computers
are Social Actors’ paradigm, showed that even computers are
treated socially by people. In fact, robots seem to be especially
well suited for benefiting from this phenomenon due to their
higher anthropomorphisation compared to other technologies
and physical autonomy in natural human environments [54],
[55]. Collocated robots are anthropomorphized more than
remote projected robots or embodied conversational agents
[56], which emphasizes the importance of physical presence.
Robots’ embodiment should be always designed in a way
that matches their tasks [57]. Both the embodiment and degrees
of freedom can influence HRI. However, the former affects the
degree to which a robot is perceived as an interaction partner,
while the latter influences the way users perceive suitability
of a robot for a current task [58]. Moreover, Hegel et al. [59]
showed that people implicitly attribute human-like qualities to
nonhuman agents. A robot’s embodiment affects the perception
of their intelligence and intentionality on neurophysiological
and behavioral levels. In addition the visual-cognition sys-
tem allocates different level of visual attention depending
on a robot’s embodiment [60]. Animate (anthropomorphic
and zoomorphic) robots attract more attention than inanimate
robots. Furthermore, a more human-like physical appearance
of a robot can increase the empathy expressed by people
towards it [61]. It is easier to relate to a robot that shares
physical similarities with a human than with one that resembles
a machine.
However, anthropomorphism defined in HRI as attribution
of humanlike properties or characteristics to real or imagined
nonhuman agents and objects [62] is not only affected by a
robot’s physical appearance. Numerous other factors have been
shown to affect perceived human-likeness of a robot, such as
movement [63], verbal communication [64], [65], emotions
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[66], gestures [67] and intelligence [68], [69]. Moreover,
there are also user related factors determining the level of
robot’s anthropomorphism, such as motivation [70], social
and cultural background [71], gender [72], group membership
[73]. Finally, mere interaction with a robot can lead to higher
anthropomorphization of it [74].
B. The importance of anthropomorphism in HRI
If anthropomorphism is such a widespread phenomenon
and there are numerous factors affecting perceived human-
likeness of a robot, why would we pay so much attention
to it? Why does HRI put such an effort to understand it
better? Why does the HRI community not just accept the
fact that anthropomorphism exists and focus their efforts on
other areas? The potential answer could be deduced from
the studies of anthropomorphism’s impact on HRI. human-
likeness plays an important role in shaping the interaction. It
can lead to decreased empathy for machine-like robots and
can be responsible for harsher treatment of them compared
to humanoids. Bartneck et al. [75] found that robots high
on anthropomorphism/zoomorphism were praised more and
punished less compared to machinelike robots, computer or
human. In another study, a Sony’s Aibo robot-dog was praised
more than a human partner, but punished just as much [76].
Similarly, a machine-like robot was abused more than a human
by receiving the highest voltage punishment [77].
In addition, human-like looking robots evoke reactions
and expectations that are similar to human-human interaction.
A humanoid is expected more than a mechanoid to adhere
to human proxemic norms in HRI [78]. However, at least
on a short-term, the violation of these norms can be coun-
teracted by the higher reward-value of interacting with an
anthropomorphic robot. Furthermore, the level of a robot’s
anthropomorphism can affect a patient’s embarrassment during
a medical checkup [79]. Finally, just the mere presence of a
robot can lead to a social facilitation effect – a participant’s
better performance in easy and worse in difficult tasks [80].
Duffy [8] emphasized the importance of considerate design and
use of robots’ anthropomorphism in order to form meaningful
interactions between people and robots. He proposed that
anthropomorphism should not be used as a solution to all HRI
problems, but rather a means that can facilitate the interaction
when it is beneficial.
Anthropomorphism can also affect the acceptance of
robots, which at the end can be a decisive factor for introduc-
ing social and service robots in natural human environments
and their further development. This leads to an important
question. What is the relationship between anthropomorphism
and acceptance? The answer is rather complex and still not
well understood. It is not enough to create an android and
create robots that resemble humans. An undoubtedly single
theory that received the most attention and tries to address
this problem is the uncanny valley hypothesis.
IV. THE UNCANNY CURVE
The uncanny valley hypothesis [81] proposes a non-linear
relationship between a robot’s anthropomorphism and likeabil-
ity. It suggests that making robots that look more humanlike
will increase their likeability. However, when the gap between
a robot and human becomes really small the emotional reaction
will instantly become strongly negative. Once the appearance
and motion become indistinguishable from real humans the
liking of a robot will be the same as for humans. Movement
of a robot is expected to amplify the emotional response in
comparison to static robots.
Although this theory gathered a lot of attention in science
and mass media alike, there is relatively little empirical proof
supporting it [82]. MacDorman [83] created a series of pictures
that included a various degree of morph of a robot and a
human. However, the outcome included images of beings that
are not realistic and therefore it should not be surprising
that they were found unfamiliar to participants. A potential
explanation of the uncanny valley theory was provided by
Saygin et al. [84], who found that compared to a human or
machine-like robot, a mechanical movement of an android
leads to higher activation of the human action perception
system using fMRI. In other words, on the neurological level
an android is not predictable as its mechanistic movement does
not fit with human appearance.
However, the uncanny valley theory received also criti-
cism in the recent years. Bartneck et al. [55] found that a
highly realistic robot (android) is liked as much as a human.
They concluded that anthropomorphism and likeability may
be multi-dimensional constructs and therefore they cannot
be projected on two dimensional space. Although, Ho and
MacDorman [85] pointed out that the scales used in that
research were correlated with warmth and as a result with
each other.
In another study toy robots and humanoids were liked more
than androids and humans [86]. Based on this finding the
authors proposed that an uncanny valley is rather an uncanny
cliff, where even the most humanlike robots are liked less than
toy robots or mechanoids. That would imply that the attempts
to build highly human-like androids might be be unfruitful,
as they will have lesser chance of being accepted than robots
with some mechanical features.
We believe that the proposed cliff is a result of having
a higher probability of designing something eerie either in
appearance, movement or interaction in an android than a more
mechanistic robot. This relation between design complexity
and likeability is presented in Figure 1. With greater human-
likeness there are more subtle ways to get it wrong and there
can be something about these subtle discrepancies that is
especially disconcerting. Potentially people are looking for
features that distinguish androids from humans and even a
slight difference may lead to their rejection. Considering the
complexity of recreating a human being, there are multiple
factors that can be done wrong. However, this problem does
not exist for non-androids. They are easily distinguishable
from humans and therefore they are not compared with them.
However, any human-like features that they may have, make
them more human-like and ultimately more liked. In other
words, we believe that androids are compared with humans
and humanoids and robotic toys likened to humans.
We perceive the following three topics as crucial for the
research on the uncanny curve to progress: fixing terminology,
finding the point at which a robot will start being compared
with a human and its likeability will drop, and investigating
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Fig. 1. The relation between complexity of design and likeability. In order
to achieve higher level of human-likeness, the complexity of design must be
increased to a level where possibility of doing something wrong is too high.
The failure to achieve the design goals leads to decreased likeability of a
robot.
the entities that lie between the deepest point of the uncanny
valley and the human level.
The first issue raised by us is important as numerous terms
were used for the y axis of the uncanny valley. The Japanese
term used by Mori (Shinwankan) [81] is particularly difficult to
translate to English. As a result human-likeness in the uncanny
valley was related to familiarity [83], likeability [55], affinity
[87], eeriness [85] or empathy [88]. Since different studies
are using different terms it reduces their comparability and
makes it harder to draw conclusions on this phenomenon.
The discussion is still open regarding which term is the most
appropriate. However, a commonly accepted conclusion would
be more than welcome to avoid diversification in the work of
different research teams as ultimately the efforts might be spent
on a wrong goal. Rather than trying to fit data to a hypothetical
graph and changing the terminology when it does not work,
we should reverse the process and try to base our hypothesis
on existing data. Moreover, it is possible that the term used by
Mori is not the best one and therefore the issue is not just a
problem of translation.
The second topic will help to understand the degree to
which a robot should be made human-like for its optimal
likeability. It can help us understand the concept of the uncanny
curve by indicating what are the characteristics that make a
robot too human-like for our liking. While the attempts to
make a robot more anthropomorphic beyond this inflection
point might lead to its lower acceptance, we believe that it is
still worth investigating creatures that are between a human
and the most disliked forms of androids.
Up to now this sudden rise of likeability in the uncanny
cliff has not been demonstrated. It is a terra incognita as the
only comparison points in studies were humans. No entities
were demonstrated to be similar enough to humans for their
likeability to increase after passing the uncanny curve. Without
that, the uncanny valley is merely an unproven hypothesis.
We suggest that in order to explore that part of the spec-
trum it is necessary to understand the opposite process to
anthropomorphization, known as dehumanization. (See also the
psychologist Caporael’s early work on ‘mechanomorphism’ –
‘the attribution of characteristics of machines to humans’ [89,
p. 216].)
V. DEHUMANIZATION
The process of dehumanization – ‘a failure to attribute
basic human qualities to others’ [90] – only recently became
a focus of interest in the field of social psychology. Haslam
[91] proposed a model of dehumanization that involves two
distinct senses of humanness: characteristics that are uniquely
human and those which form human nature. Denying the
former attributes leads to perception of humans as animal-
like, while denying the latter makes them object or automata
like. Uniquely human (UH) characteristics are what separates
humans from animals, such as intelligence, emotion recog-
nition or self-control. On the other hand, features that are
typical of or central to humans are referred to as human nature
(HN) characteristics, such as primary emotions, warmth or
personality. Therefore, characteristics that form the core of
humanness may not be the same as those which distinguish
us from other species.
There are several aspects that differentiate these two senses
of humanness:
• UH characteristics reflect socialization and culture,
while HN characteristics link humans to their inborn
biological dispositions.
• UH characteristics reflect social learning and can
vary across cultures and populations. HN is prevalent
within populations and universal across different cul-
tures.
• HN is essential, inherent and natural, while UH may
not be perceived as essential.
• UH involves refinement, civility, morality, and higher
cognition. NH involves cognitive flexibility, emotion-
ality, vital agency, and warmth.
There are also different consequences of depriving humans
of UH and HN characteristics [91]:
• A person deprived of UH traits is perceived as dis-
gusting, while lack of HN traits implies indifference
and lack of empathy.
• Lack of UH characteristics leads to perception of a
person as subhuman and lack of HN as nonhuman.
• Deprivation of HN affects intergroup contexts and of
UH affects intergroup and interpersonal contexts [92].
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An important notion is that dehumanization does not only
occur in extreme situation, but is rather common in its milder
forms in our everyday social life [91]. Some social groups
are implicitly and explicitly attributed less UH characteristics
(e.g artists) and therefore likened to animals, while other
(e.g. businesspeople) are attributed less HN characteristics and
likened to automata [93].
Understanding how dehumanization affects perception of
humanness can give a new perspective on the process of
anthropomorphization in HRI. It provides an indication of what
characteristics may affect a user’s perception of the degree
to which a robot is perceived as human-like, and tools and
methods used to measure dehumanization can be used in
HRI for measuring anthropomorphism. The first publications
appearing in HRI prove the potential of this approach [66],
[67]. Another form of dehumanization can be also found in
[86] where some of the images of human faces were modified
with a slightly green hue to produce a mildly artificial look.
Moreover, we believe that using attributes of dehumaniza-
tion can permit studies of the uncanny curve in actual HRI.
Most of the studies conducted up to date suffered from at least
one of the following problems:
• Images of robots were used rather than real robots.
• Static images or videos did not permit any interaction.
• Morphing images made unnatural creatures that can-
not be found in the real world.
• The studies did not include long-term or even short-
term HRI.
The first 3 problems lead to a potential lack of generaliz-
ability for HRI. It is possible that the uncanny valley, indicated
by studies involving images, will have no relevance for an
interaction between a user and robot. Furthermore, even if
we assume that it impacts the interaction, its impact can be
potentially marginal as the perceived human-likeness of a robot
will change during the course of the interaction and therefore
the effect will be limited to the very first few seconds of the
interaction, e.g. Kiesler and Goetz [94] showed that robot’s
personality and speech can influence anthropomorphism more
than embodiment. Moreover, the fourth problem indicated
above is equally important. The perceived anthropomorphism
of a robot is not a constant. It changes during the course of
the interaction. Fussell et al. [74] showed that mere interaction
with a robot leads to more anthropomorphic conceptions of
robots. We notice the role that embodiment can have on a
person’s willingness to initiate an interaction with a robot.
However, we believe that at least the same amount of effort, if
not more, should be given to the interaction design rather than
physical appearance design of a robotic platform, since the
former’s relation with the uncanny curve is even less known,
despite the fact that the majority of interactions with robots
are expected to last definitely longer than a few seconds.
To overcome these problems the studies should involve
some form of HRI. The inclusion of attributes derived from
studies of dehumanization can allow us to manipulate the
level of anthropomorphism necessary to create entities that
minimally differ from human beings in actual HRI. Therefore,
the real test for the uncanny curve would be to see if it applies
to robots behaving in human-like ways.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We know that people anthropomorphize and have theories
why it is such a common phenomenon. However, our under-
standing of its impact on HRI is in its infancy. Even the most-
discussed hypothesis related to anthropomorphism in recent
years, the uncanny valley, cannot be considered as anything
more than an unproven theory. In this paper we pointed out
some of the mistakes from which studies of the uncanny curve
suffered:
• The lack of fixed terminology for y axis leads to poor
comparability of studies.
• The inclusion of only images or videos of robots
reduces the generalizability of the results for actual
HRI.
• Considering anthropomorphism as something constant
that does not change during the course of interaction
has a lot of existing evidence of the opposite process
to overcome.
Whereas all these issues on their own indicate that Mori’s
theory might receive more attention than it really should,
there is a much bigger concern that should be addressed.
The uncanny valley assumes that at some point entities that
are sufficiently human-like will lead to increased likeability.
However, to date this part of the valley has never been
explored. This could be a statement about the power of media
– everybody beliefs the curve to be the valley just because
everybody else talks about it. However, there is no empirical
evidence supporting the hypothesis. Therefore, rather than
trying to fit data to the graph, we believe that the community
should fit the graph to the available data. That is clearly an
uncanny curve not valley.
Furthermore, the left side of the uncanny curve is rather
well explored. The really interesting part of the graph is the
right side as it has never been shown to exist. What we propose
is to use the attributes from studies of dehumanization in order
to affect the perceived human-likeness of robots in the real HRI
rather than static images. These robots might be able to possess
enough human-like qualities to pass the uncanny bottom in the
interaction.
Finally, the question is whether there can be entities beyond
the human on the graph. Are biological humans the ultimate
end of humanness or can there be entities more ‘human’
than biological humans? Several influential researchers in
AI currently forecast ‘software-based humans’; they promise
immortality for all, in a virtual state or implemented in a
cybernetic body. Will software-based humans be human? And
even if these forecasts are fantasy, it is certainly possible
that future humans will have invisible implants that provide
superpowers, such as extreme strength enabling a person to
lift a car with one hand. Where should we place such a person
on the uncanny curve?
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